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On the contrary, I support the conventional view, expressed recently in Hacker 1996b , that Moore and Russell were the real founding fathers of analytic philosophy.
Criticism of Dummett.
Fortunately, not all philosophers accept the thesis of the intrinsically linguistic character of analytic philosophy. Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker, for example, have noted some twenty years ago:
It is curious to find Dummett and Sluga joining hands in contending that Frege was the founder of analytic philosophy, the characteristic tenet of which is that philosophy of language is the foundation of the rest of philosophy. If 'analytic philosophy' includes the later Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Austin among its luminaries, if analytic philosophy of law includes Hart or Kelsen, if analytic philosophy of history includes Berlin or Dray, if analytic philosophy of politics includes Nozick or Rawls, then it is not a characteristic tenet of the 'school'. On the contrary, it would be denied, both in theory and in practice, by all these philosophers. (Baker and Hacker 1984, p. 7 n.) In the last years there has been a strong tendency to accept this view. Today, even more authors are beginning to realise that what I read in Chisholm, Perry, Nozick, Kripke, Evans, Lewis, Kaplan, Putnam and Dennett are 'conceptual analyses, which are unjustly called "language-analytical" ' (Frank 1992, p. 419 ).
But it is also a historical fact that a variant of analytic philosophy has been developed which was expressly not a philosophy of language-Brentano's school of descriptive psychology. The main innovation of this school was 'the introduction of a new level of exactness into philosophy' (Mulligan 1986, p. 86 (Brentano 1975, p. 8) Brentano was (as if in G. E. Moore's manner) above all against the unclarity in thinking and language. This was a tradition of 'criticism of every sort of anti-scientific and obscure philosophizing' (Mulligan 1986, p. 89), and nothing beyond that. (Russell 1960, p. 11) Apparently, 'speculative', as used by analytic philosophers, is not a descriptive term. This explains the readiness with which typically analytical philosophers often get fascinated with typical speculative philosophers. Wittgenstein's interest in Spengler, Spranger, etc. is the best example for this.
(d) Analytic Philosophy is Clarification. In a famous paper, published more than a half a century ago, Henry Price used the concepts 'clarification' and 'analysis' as synonyms (see Price 1945, p. 3) ; to him, analytic philosophers are 'clarificatory philosophers'. Unfortunately, this, too, is not a comprehensive definition of analytic philosophy. Indeed, while the latter was introduced as something totally new-as a revolution in philosophy-in the history of philosophy, already Epicures (among many others) 'was so lucid a writer that in the work On Rhetoric he makes clearness the sole requisite' (Diog. Laert., Vitae philosophorum, X,13 (Engfer 1982, p. 10) . This was characteristic for both rationalists (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz), and empiricist (Locke, Berkeley, Hume). All they hoped to achieve conceptions of philosophical method with the help of mathematical methodology called more geometrico, or arte combinatoria.
(f) Analytic Philosophy is Exact Philosophy. Some authors accept that analytic philosophy can be defined as 'exact philosophy', meaning with this, above all, scientific philosophy (see Mulligan 1993, p. 133) .
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Criticism. First of all, there is an idiosyncratic use of the term 'exact', as used in 'exact sciences', which means that philosophic theories are expressed in precise terms and figures. Thus recently the term 'exact philosophy' was used 'to signify mathematical philosophy, i.e. philosophy done with the explicit help of mathematical logic and mathematics' (Bunge 1973, p. v) . This certainly is not the comprehensive description of the authentic analytic philosophy.
Secondly, there were heroic efforts to build something like exact philosophy in the past which didnot led to establishing something similar to the authentic analytic philosophy. Such an attempt was made, for example, in 1877-8 in Germany with the launch of Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, under the editorship of Richard Avenarius. The program of the movements was: Philosophy must be occupied with scientific problems, the sources of which came from experience; it must be a theory of science and knowledge.
Historically, this program was a result of the final separation of church and state in Germany, reflected in the so called Kulturkampf in this country from after 1872. Unfortunately, after 1878, as a reaction to the increasing influence of the socialism in Germany (of the social democrats), the program was replaced by a new interest towards practical philosophy. Apparently, the authentic analytic philosophy emerged in a specific social context (which I shall discuss in § 4).
But I have also another, third, argument against defining analytic philosophy as 'exact philosophy'. One of the most prominent figures of the Oxford school of language philosophy, J. L. Austin was explicitly against the strive for exactness in philosophy.
WHAT IT IS? 7
Analytic philosophy can be defined at least in two perspectives: theoretical, and historical.
(a) Historically, analytic philosophy was introduced as a revolution in philosophy, as (b) Theoretically, analytic philosophy means 'rigorous philosophy'. 2 Its aim is to produce theories, ideas, theses, which bear examination through contra arguments.
Authentic analytic philosophy is 'examined philosophy': examined by the reason. Its best description was given by its founding father Russell in his paper 'Mysticism and Logic': This is a philosophy which uses 'the harmonizing mediation of reason, which tests our beliefs by their mutual compatibility, and examines, in doubtful cases, the possible sources of error on the one side and on the other.' (Russell 1918, p. 17 ) This is 8 a procedure of 'scientific restrain and balance ' (ibid., p. 20) . In opposition, the Old Philosophy (called later, misleadingly, 'continental') produces theories, ideas, which do not bear such an examination. As a result, they are consistent only for sympathetic minds. Seen from counter-perspective, they quickly disintegrate.
This broad definition of the analytic philosophy suggests that it is something like an approach, not a doctrine. Recently, it was rightly noted that 'what distinguished analytic philosophy is rather a particular way of approaching philosophical problems' (Føllesdal 1996, p. 196 ).
This position is in accordance with the following fact. For decades it was claimed that analytic philosophy has a rather narrow subject-matter. In the last years, though, it got clear that using this approach, a wide variety of topics can be treated. As recently noted, 'the sphere of interest of analytic philosophy began to widen out in the late fifties, and there are now few philosophical questions that have not fallen within its purview' (Mulligan 1993, p. 139) . This insight would be expendable if analytic philosophers paid more attention to Russell's instructions that the New Philosophy 'is, in essence, not contrary to that spirit [to mysticism] . . . , but rather [to] the outcome of this very spirit as applied to the realm of thought' (Russell 1918, p. 21) .
FACTIONS
A main difficulty by investigating the history of analytic philosophy is that it was essentially dualistic from the very beginning. Despite having a common strategyphilosophy must be rigorous!-the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Moore and Russell, embraced different tactics for its realising: while Russell was scientifically oriented, Moore was mainly an analytic hermeneut (a term to be explained bellow).
Indeed, they were not pure, but mainly so. Thus shortly before 1900 Russell urged
Moore to embrace philosophical logic-and the latter really did so. On the other hand, despite being a scientific philosopher, Russell always believed that the New Philosophy has its own-called by him 'analytic'-method, which, in fact, he understood as close to Moore's analytic hermeneutics. In contrast, to the later analytic philosophers, Quine and Davidson (I consciously oppse them to the early analytic philosophers), Russell always was a bit analytic hermeneut. In particular, he believed that he has established a specific philosophical method with the help of which he can fight the old, 'scolastic' philosophy. Unfortunately, Russell failed to articulate it.
This dualism lies at the very bottom of the project for a New Philosophy and thus was of first rate importance for the future development of the movement. In particular, it gave rise to the later split in it in two wings: that of analytic hermeneutics, and that of reasons-supplying analytism, which I am going to discuss now.
(a) As already mentioned, analytic hermeneutic was introduced by Moore. Disadvantages. They are even more conspicuous than that of the analytic hermeneutics. Already before the second world war it was noted that one of the reasons for the attractiveness of analytic philosophy is that it suggests 'intellectual games with chess-like indifference. ... It is the sheer intellectual virtuosity of the performance which in large measure captivates student interest.' (Nagel 1956, p. 197) Unfortunately, since the aim of this type of analytic philosophy is, first and foremost, to built strictly consistent systems of statements, it easily turns to a mind-game. What is characteristic of it is that the philosophical-game creates in the players the illusion that it is actually not a game, but rather something utterly 'serious'-very serious indeed.
The results are exemplars of what Ramsey has called 'analytic scholastics'. An example: when theory of thinking was replaced by theory of reference, all believed that 12 a new age in philosophy began life. Unfortunately, the expected perspicuity didn't came. Today the 'current theories of reference are as dense and varied as reflections on the Trinity of Byzantine philology' (Danto 1980, p. 634 ).
SOCIAL-POLITICAL CONTEXT
As already noted, decisive by the emergence of the real analytic philosophy was a series of social and political factors. Danto also found that 'its spirit, tone, and technologies dominate not only in America and the Commonwealth, but throughout Western civilization, of which France is not altogether a part' (Danto 1980, p. 615 ).
My claim is analytic philosophy was developed in the struggle for intellectual power between German and British philosophy in the first decades of this century. Its birth marked the victory of the latter over the former. In the literature it was already noticed that 'Germany's dramatic rise to power in the sixties of the last [nineteenth] century was impressive enough to make the leading British philosophers of the next generationCaird, T. H. Green, Bosanquet, McTaggart-ardent Hegelians' (Carr 1939, p. 70) . This interest in precisely those rejected philosophers: Hegel, the young Marx, and then more recent German Idealists. (Magee 1986, p. 29) phers'.
Fortunatelly, the worry of these two philosophers turned out to be groundless. (c) Analytic Philosophy and Modernity. Ryle was the first to notice that analytic philosophy is a result of the institutional revolution which took place at the end of the last century. The main characteristic of this revolution was the radical secularising of society and education. 7 As a result, a new 'professional philosophy' emerged, the effect of which was the liberation from psychology 8 and also from political sciences, religious studies and economics.
6 See Milkov 2003 . The aftermath of these developments was a further linguisticalising of analytic philosophy in the Vienna Circle, which was canonised in America by Carnap and Tarski.
7 As Ryle put it, 'between the time when Bradley was an undergraduate and the time when 1 was an undergraduate the population of intellectuals, and particularly of academic intellectuals in the British Isles had changed from being a predominantly clerical to an almost entirely lay population.' (Ryle 1956, p. 2.) In Britain, the reform in the study of philosophy can be tracked down to 1822, when 'the system of honours and prices' was introduced. As Mark Pattison has noted in 1876, it turned philosophy into 'mechanical work. . . . What the aspirant for honours requires is a repetiteur, who knows "the schools".' (Pattison 1876, p. 89) Having these developments in view, the fall of 'speculative' philosophy was easy to predict more than 120 years ago. As Pattison concludes at the end of his essay, 'for speculative effort, there is no place in such a system.' (p. 90)
Similarly, many major developments in analytic philosophy in the last fifty years were connected with institutional changes in British universities. These changes include, among other things, a dramatic rise in enrolment and the increase in number of faculties of philosophy after the World War II. All this required philosophy courses with a fixed subject in which it is evident to university authorities that there is something that had to be learned step-by-step: A subject that makes possible an objective and exact examination and jurying competing theses, papers, and books, just as it is done in the curriculum of other academic disciplines.
(d) Ideologically. Artur Danto has noted that the borders of analytic philosophy 'are virtually coincident with the boundaries of capitalism' (Danto 1980, p. 615) .
